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The Self-Schema Model: A Theoretical 
Approach to the Self-Concept 
in Eating Disorders 
Karen Farchaus Stein 
Over the last several decades, the self-concept has been implicated as a 
important determinant of eating disorders (ED). Although considerable 
progress has been made, questions remain unanswered about the proper- 
ties of self-concept that distinguish women with an ED from other 
populations, and mechanisms that link the self-concept to the disordered 
behaviors. Markus's self-schema model is presented as a theoretical 
approach to explore the role of the self-concept in ED. To show how the 
schema model can be integrated with existing work on the self-concept in 
ED, a framework is proposed that addresses  the number, content, and 
accessibility of the self-schemas.  More specifically, it is posited that a 
limited collection of positive self-schemas available in memory, in combina- 
tion with a chronically and inflexibly accessible body-weight self-schema, 
lead to the disordered behaviors associated with anorexia nervosa and 
bulimia nervosa. 
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T HE EATING DISORDERS of anorexia ner- vosa and bulimia nervosa represent a major 
health problem among adolescent and young adult 
women in the United States. Prevalence estimates 
suggest that up to 2% of adolescent and young 
adult women suffer from anorexia nervosa (AN) 
while an additional 3% to 6% suffer from bulimia 
nervosa (BN) (Drewnowski, Yee, & Krahn, 1988; 
Fisher, et al., 1995; Lucas, Beard, O'Fallon, & 
Kurland, 1991). The unusual, if not bizarre, constel- 
lation of behaviors associated with AN and BN 
exert a devastating toll on the lives of women 
afflicted with the disorders. As many as 18% of 
women with an eating disorder die of medical 
complications (Patton, 1988; Theander, 1985). Oth- 
ers experience serious physical problems including 
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cardiac arrhythmias, gastrointestinal complica- 
tions, electrolyte disturbances, and thermoregula- 
tory problems (Halmi, 1987; Herzog, 1992; Palla & 
Litt, 1988; Sharp & Freeman, 1993). In addition to 
the grave medical consequences, the disorders are 
also associated with severe emotional distress and 
impaired social, academic, and occupational func- 
tioning (Schlundt & Johnson, 1990; Toner, 
Garfinkel, & Garner, 1986; Thompson, 1994). 
Although many important differences between 
AN and BN have been identified (Bruch, 1985; 
Fava, Copeland, Schweiger, & Herzog, 1989; 
Wooley & Kearney-Cooke, 1986), for both disor- 
ders, deviations in the self-concept have been 
thought to play a pivotal role in the etiology. In one 
of the earliest modem theoretical models of the 
eating disorders, Bruch (1973) argued that the 
pathological pursuit of thinness in AN stems from 
impaired identity formation in adolescence and a 
lack of clarity in the definition of the self. Since that 
time, theoretical, empirical, and clinical accounts 
of both AN and BN have consistently focused on 
attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts about the self as a 
key source of the eating and weight-related sympto- 
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mology (American Psychiatric Association, 1993; 
Fisher, et al., 1995). 
Despite the long-standing interest in the self- 
concept in eating disorders a coherent body of 
empirically supported knowledge that can be used 
to direct clinical practice, has yet to emerge (Cash 
& Brown, 1987). Although there are many possible 
causes of this limited progress, one important 
source of difficulty is that research completed to 
date has tended to be based on clinical models of 
psychopathology but has lacked a theoretical frame- 
work for the self-concept. Historically, theories of 
the self-concept were highly abstract and general in 
nature (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Marsh & Richards, 
1988), providing little direction for those interested 
in exploring the link between the self-concept and 
disordered eating behaviors. However, over the last 
decade, Markus and her colleagues (Markus & 
Nurius, 1986; Markus & Sentis, 1982; Markus & 
Wurf, 1987) have developed the schema model of 
the self-concept that offers a clearer and more 
concise definition of the construct, while preserv- 
ing its complex multidimensional nature. As such, 
the schema model holds potential for strengthening 
our theoretical understanding of the self-concept 
deviations associated with AN and BN, and ulti- 
mately will contribute to the development of more 
refined theoretically-driven intervention strategies. 
The purpose of this report is to present the 
schema model of the self-concept as a theoretical 
framework that has the potential for explaining 
how the self-concept contributes to the onset and 
maintenance of disordered eating and weight- 
related behaviors associated with AN and BN. The 
report will begin with a review of existing ap- 
proaches to the self-concept in AN and BN. Then, a 
brief overview of the schema model will be pre- 
sented and an integration of this model with 
existing work on the eating disorders will be 
discussed. Finally, implications of the schema 
model for future research and clinical practice will 
be addressed. 
Although the incidence of eating disorders among 
males has increased in recent years, prevalence 
data suggest AN and BN are disorders primarily 
afflicting females (American Psychiatric Associa- 
tion, 1993). For this reason, along with the fact that 
most theoretical and empirical work completed to 
date has focused on female populations, this paper 
will focus on the nature of the self-concept in 
women with an eating disorder. 
THE SELF-CONCEPT AND EATING 
DISORDERS: A REVIEW OF EXISTING 
MODELS 
AN is a clinical syndrome characterized by an 
intense fear of becoming fat, a body weight of 85% 
less than expected based on age and height, feelings 
of fatness in the face of objective emaciation and 
amenorrhea (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). BN--also a clinical syndrome---is similarly 
marked by a preoccupation with body size and 
shape (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). In 
addition, women with BN engage in food bingeing 
and purging cycles in which self-induced vomiting, 
laxatives, diuretics, fasting, and extreme exercise 
regimens are used. 
Although AN and BN are similar in that they 
share the symptoms of body weight preoccupations 
(Vitousek & Hollen, 1990), the nature of the 
relationship between the two disorders remains 
unclear. Some theorists view AN and BN on a 
continuum of eating disorders in which patterns of 
severe dietary restriction eventually leads to binge/ 
purging cycles (Boskind-Lodahl, 1976; Fairbarn & 
Garner, 1986; Polivy & Herman, 1985; White, 
1991). Others suggest a distinct and clear demarca- 
tion between the two disorders arguing that they are 
marked by unique personality profiles and etiolo- 
gies (Bruch, 1985; Gordon, 1990; Wooley & Kear- 
ney-Cooke, 1986). More recent approaches to the 
eating disorders propose that there are three sub- 
populations of women with an eating disorder 
including: (1) restricting-type AN, (2) bulimic-type 
AN, and (3) BN in individuals of normal weight 
(American Psychological Association, 1994; 
Strober, 1981). 
Although the debate on the relationship between 
AN and BN continues, models of the self-concept 
deviations that contribute to the disordered eating 
behaviors are remarkably similar for both syn- 
dromes. For both AN and BN, three types of 
self-concept deviations have been addressed includ- 
ing: (1) deficits in identity formation, (2) distor- 
tions in body image, and (3) body dissatisfaction 
and low self-esteem. 
Identity Disturbance 
One of the earliest approaches to the self-concept 
in eating disorders focuses on the process of 
identity formation in childhood and adolescence. 
This model, which was initially put forth by Bruch 
(1973) and later elaborated by other theorists, 
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focuses on the dynamics of the parent-child relation- 
ship and the resultant developmental deviations in 
the establishment of a separate and stable sense of 
the self (Garfinkel & Garner, 1983). According to 
Bruch, AN is "a struggle for a self-respecting 
identity" (Bruch, 1979, p. 255). Highly controlling 
and perfectionistic parents limit the child's opportu- 
nities for autonomous functioning by responding to 
her based on their expectations for perfection rather 
than to the child's expressed needs and desires. 
Within this environment, the child fails to develop 
a sense of herself as an autonomous, volitional 
agent but rather relies on her parents as her source 
of self-definition (Bruch, 1981). The child experi- 
ences the self as acting in accordance to demands 
from others while experiencing deep-seated feel- 
ings of being "nothing" (Bruch, 1982). As the child 
encounters the biological and social challenges 
associated with adolescence, this lack of self- 
definition gives rise to overwhelming feelings of 
incompetence, self-doubt, and fears of loosing 
control. Within this framework, the weight-loss and 
food-restricting behaviors are a maladaptive way of 
defining the self and establishing a sense of self- 
control (Bruch, 1982). 
Other theorists who have taken a more culturally 
based approach to the etiology of eating disorders, 
similarly view problems in selfhood and identity 
formation as an important cause of the syndromes 
(Boskind-Lodahl, 1976; Gordon, 1990). However, 
in these models, culturally shaped values, norms, 
and expectations for women undermine the devel- 
opment of an independent, satisfying, and work- 
able definition of the self. An exaggerated adher- 
ence to the cultural ideal of women as dependent, 
accommodating, and beautiful (Boskind-Lodahl, 
1976; Striegel-Moore, Silberstein, & Rodin, 1986), 
or conflict generated by the competing visions of 
the ideal woman as both bright, competent, accom- 
plished, pleasing, compliant, and unassertive (Gor- 
don, 1990) become the organizing framework for 
one's self-definition and impede the processes of 
self-exploration and discovery. The resultant lack 
of a authentic identity is viewed as the proximal 
cause of the disordered behaviors, whereas the 
cultural context is viewed as the more distal, yet 
critical cause. 
In contrast to the models that focus on external 
causes of identity problems associated with AN and 
BN, Strober (1991) highlights the role of biologi- 
cally-driven temperamental differences. Building 
on work that has shown innate differences in 
temperament or styles of relating to the environ- 
ment (i.e., patterns of approach-withdrawal to 
novel stimuli, adaptability to change, intensity of 
reactivity, and persistence), Strober argues a biologi- 
cal basis to the impaired identity-formation associ- 
ated with AN. According to this perspective, an 
innate style of stimulus-avoidance, low novelty 
seeking, emotional reactivity, and reward depen- 
dence interfere with normal exploratory activities 
necessary to for the development of an agentic and 
autonomous self. 
Common across these various theoretical ap- 
proaches is the view that the preoccupation with 
body weight and the disordered eating behavior are 
a maladaptive attempt to compensate for a disor- 
dered concept of the self---one that is immature, 
impoverished, and incomplete (American Psychiat- 
ric Association, 1993). Although this conceptualiza- 
tion of the self-concept in eating disorders is widely 
accepted within the medical literature, little empiri- 
cally based knowledge is available to support the 
claim (for exception, see Schupak-Neuberg & 
Nemeroff, 1993). Because the approach is derived 
from clinical theories of psychopathology, avail- 
able supporting evidence is primarily in the form of 
case studies and other clinical vignettes. To date, 
few attempts have been made to use current 
self-concept theories and methodologies to more 
systematically explore this theoretical perspective. 
Body Image Distortions 
A second focus of work on the self-concept in 
eating disorders addresses body-image distur- 
bances. The main hypothesis motivating this work 
is that the disordered eating behaviors of AN and 
BN stem from the subjective experience of one's 
body--either overall or specific parts--as larger or 
fatter than it objectively is (Cooper & Taylor, 1988; 
Home, Van Vactor, & Emerson, 1991; Rosen, 
1990). Particularly with AN, body size overestima- 
tion is viewed as so central to the disorder that it is 
identified in the DSM-IV as one of the four 
essential defining features (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994). Although body size overestima- 
tion is not one of the diagnostic criteria for BN, it is 
considered a very common symptom of the disor- 
der that is associated with higher levels of disor- 
dered eating, low self-esteem and mood (Cooper & 
Taylor, 1988). For both disorders, body size over- 
estimation is thought to be a indicator of poor 
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outcome (Bruch, 1981; Touyz, Beumont, & Col- 
lins, 1988). 
One popular approach to empirically document- 
ing body-image disturbances in eating disorders is 
to examine the accuracy of body-size estimations. 
A variety of procedures including the moving 
caliper technique (Slade & Russell, 1973), the 
image marking method (Askevold, 1975), the dis- 
torting photograph technique (Glucksman & Hir- 
sch, 1969), and paper-and-pencil body ratings 
(Home, Van Vactor, & Emerson, 1991) have been 
to used to compare the person's subjective estima- 
tions of the size of various body parts with objec- 
tive measurements of the body. 
Although the findings of a majority of studies on 
body-image distortions converge to suggest that 
women with AN and BN overestimate their body 
size--both overall and specific regions--several 
questions about the meaning and significance of the 
findings remain unanswered (Cash & Brown, 1987; 
Garner & Garfinkel, 1981). One important question 
has to do with the mechanisms underlying the size 
overestimation (Meermann, Vandereycken, & Napi- 
erski, 1986). Some investigators argue that the 
body size overestimation is an indicator of underly- 
ing perceptual processing abnormalities. This per- 
spective is founded on the theory that women with 
AN are unable to accurately perceive internal 
sensations (Bruch, 1973). The impaired ability to 
perceive and interpret proprioceptive information 
is believed to stem from the lack of synchrony in 
the parental-child relationship and is thought to 
lead to the inability to accurately perceive physi- 
ological signals such as hunger and satiety, emo- 
tional states such as anger and sadness, and informa- 
tion about one's body boundaries and shape (Strober, 
1981). Other investigators suggest that the body 
estimation techniques measure structural distor- 
tions or aberrations in the established mental repre- 
sentations about the self (Garner & Garfinkel, 
1981). According to this perspective, the individu- 
al's mental representation of her body is inaccurate 
and too large. Although a variety of causes of this 
inaccurate representation have been posited (Fa- 
bian & Thompson, 1989), one of the more popular 
hypotheses is that the body image was formed 
during a period when the individual was heavier 
and the representation failed to accommodate to the 
thinner body size (Crisp & Kalucy, 1974; Wooley 
& Wooley, 1985). Finally, other investigators sug- 
gest that the body estimation techniques may 
actually tap a variety of motivational factors, such 
as denial of illness or experimenter demand, rather 
than perceptual or cognitive aspects of body image 
(Garner & Garfinkel, 1982; Hsu, 1982). 
Another important question associated with body- 
image research focuses on the role that body-size 
overestimation plays in the dysregulated eating and 
weight-related behaviors associated with AN and 
BN. Studies have shown that body-size overestima- 
tion and accompanying subjective feelings of fat- 
ness do not reliably distinguish women with eating 
disorders from other populations without these 
disorders, including asymptomatic controls, preg- 
nant women, obese women, and those who engage 
in subclinical levels of disordered eating behaviors 
(Casper, Halmi, Goldberg, Eckert, & Davis, 1979; 
Cooper & Taylor, 1988; Strober, Goldenberg, Green, 
& Saxon, 1979). The pervasiveness of body-size 
overestimation in populations of women without 
eating disorders (Rodin, 1984) raises important 
questions about how body-image disturbance causes 
severe dysfunctional behaviors in some subsamples 
of women, whereas others function normally in the 
domain. Despite the long-standing interest, the 
source of body-size overestimation and the mecha- 
nisms to account for the linkage with the disordered 
behaviors remain unclear. 
Self-Esteem Disturbances 
The third type of self-concept deviation that has 
been linked to AN and BN is a disturbance in 
attitudes toward the self. The two attitudes most 
commonly addressed in the eating-disorder litera- 
ture include body satisfaction and global self- 
esteem. Body satisfaction is an intuitively appeal- 
ing construct that generally refers to the level of 
positive versus negative feelings towards the physi- 
cal self (Rosen, 1990). Operational definitions of 
the construct range from statements about the 
extent to which one likes specific parts of the body 
(i.e., hips, bust, or face) or the overall physical self; 
evaluations of one's body size, again either specific 
parts or overall body; or the degree of discrepancy 
between one's perceived size and desired size. 
Global self-esteem is defined as the level of satisfac- 
tion with one's overall self and is typically mea- 
sured with a paper-and-pencil questionnaire such as 
the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 
1965). 
Despite the lack of consistency in the definitions 
of body satisfaction, studies have consistently 
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shown that women with an eating disorder evaluate 
their bodies more negatively than women without 
eating disorders (Cash & Brown, 1987; Rosen, 
1990). In addition, they report lower global self- 
esteem than women without disorders (Attie & 
Brooks-Gunn, 1989; Huon & Brown, 1984; Wil- 
liams, et al., 1993). However, with results similar to 
body-size overestimation, other populations of 
women have also been found to have high levels of 
body dissatisfaction and low self-esteem (Rodin, 
Silberstein, & Streigel-Moore, 1985). These find- 
ings, along with those of studies that suggest that 
low self-esteem is also associated with other psychi- 
atric illness that are prevalent in women such as 
depression (Beck, 1967), suggest that negative 
attitudes towards the self are not pathognomonic to 
eating disorders. Rather, low self-esteem may be 
only part of a larger~constellation of self-concept 
deviations associated with the disorders. 
Summary and Critique 
Over the last few decades, considerable effort 
has been directed toward furthering our understand- 
ing of the nature of the self-concept in eating 
disorders. Diverse theoretical and methodological 
orientations have been used to explore self-concept 
deviations and have contributed to the establish- 
ment of a broad base of knowledge pointing to the 
importance of thoughts, images, and attitudes about 
the self in patients with AN and BN. Yet despite the 
progress that has been made, continued efforts are 
needed to move our understandings to a more 
refined, comprehensive, and integrated level. 
A common problem across the existing work on 
eating disorders is the lack of a theoretical model of 
the self-concept. This gap, found both in the 
theoretical models of the eating disorders and in the 
empirical work, has impacted the emerging body of 
knowledge in several important ways. First, the 
lack of theoretical definitions of the self-concept 
constructs has made the identification of meaning- 
ful and appropriate operational definitions difficult 
and has impeded the empirical investigation of rich 
and important clinical theories. Second, the lack of 
a theoretical model of the self-concept has inter- 
fered with the specification of the mechanisms to 
link the self-concept with the disordered-eating 
behaviors. For example, although there is consider- 
able empirical evidence suggesting women with an 
eating disorder overestimate their body size and 
have low self-esteem, currently we have limited 
understanding of exactly how these aspects of the 
self-concept lead to the specific patterns of disor- 
dered eating associated with AN and BN. Finally, 
the lack of a comprehensive model of the self- 
concept has led to a tradition of research that 
focuses on single, isolated aspects of the self- 
concept such as identity, body image, and self- 
esteem but has yet to consider how these various 
aspects may function together to contribute to the 
behaviors (Keeton, Cash, & Brown, 1990). The 
findings of studies that show certain self-concept 
deviations are found not only in populations of 
women with eating disorders but other populations 
of women as well, raise an interesting possibility 
that a constellation of self-concept deviations may 
be necessary for the formation and maintenance of 
the eating disorder symptomology. A comprehen- 
sive theoretical model of the self-concept may 
facilitate consideration of how various aspects 
function together to motivate and regulate the 
disordered-eating behaviors. 
THE SCHEMA MODEL OF THE SELF-CONCEPT 
The schema model of the self-concept, a contem- 
porary approach to the study of the self developed 
within the field of cognitive social psychology, is 
based on the assumption that behavioral responses 
to stimuli are mediated through an internal system 
of knowledge structures sometimes referred to as 
schemas (Goldfried & Robins, 1983; Markus & 
Zajonc, 1985). Schemas are organizations of knowl- 
edge that are constructed through interaction with 
the environment and reflect the person's construal 
of an object or event. Once schemas are formed, 
they are stored in long-term memory and act as the 
foundation for the processing of subsequent interac- 
tions with the environment (Taylor & Crocker, 
1981). Although schemas may be formed around 
any aspect of the environment, either social or 
asocial, Markus (1977) posits that to process the 
vast array of self-relevant stimuli routinely encoun- 
tered, people construct knowledge structures about 
the self, referred to as self-schemas. 
Self-Schemas 
Self-schemas are stable and enduring memory 
structures about the self that integrate and summa- 
rize a person's thoughts, feelings and experiences 
about the self in a specific behavioral domain 
(Markus & Sentis, 1982). Self-schemas can be 
formed around any aspect of the person, including 
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physical characteristics, social roles, personality 
traits, skills, competencies, and interests. They are 
established in domains that the individual values, 
and they reflect the time and effort invested in the 
domain (Markus, 1977). To date, studies have 
documented the availability of self-schemas in a 
variety of behavioral domains including body weight 
(Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987), exercise (Kendz- 
ierski, 1988), sex roles (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, 
& Siladi, 1982), independence (Markus, 1977; 
Stein & Markus, 1990), and academic performance 
(Stein, 1994). 
Self-schemas have been compared with the 
knowledge structures of experts in a specific do- 
main, such as chess (Caire, 1994). That is, they are 
highly elaborated, well-organized, and enduring 
organizations of knowledge. Like other expert 
knowledge structures, self-schemas include not 
only declarative knowledge about what the self 
"is" but also procedural rules, strategies, and 
routines that direct and regulate behavior in the 
domain (see Cantor, 1990; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 
1984 for reviews). Self-schemas are the cognitive 
framework through which social stimuli are per- 
ceived, interpreted, and recalled (Goldfried & Rob- 
bins, 1983; Greenwald, 1980; Markus & Wurf, 
1987). Furthermore, because self-schemas include 
procedural knowledge, the person with a self- 
schema in the domain has a rich repertoire of 
behaviors available that enables efficient, compe- 
tent, and consistent functioning in the domain 
(Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987). It is these functional 
properties of the self-schemas that link them to 
behavior. 
The Total Self-Concept 
Another advantage of the schema model is that it 
leads to a richer and more complex definition of the 
self-concept. Historically, the self-concept was con- 
ceptualized as a single unitary entity that reflected 
one's overall evaluation of the self (i.e., global 
self-esteem) (Markus & Wurf, 1987; Woolfolk, 
Novalany, Gara, Allen, & Polino, 1995). Within the 
schema model, however, the self-concept is defined 
as a complex system of cognitions about the self. 
The self-concept refers to the person's total collec- 
tion of cognitions about the self that are articulated 
in memory including the self-schemas and other 
less fully elaborated images of the self (Cantor & 
Kihlstrom, 1987; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; 
Markus & Wurf, 1987). 
Based on the schema model, several important 
sources of individual difference in the self-concept 
can be identified including: (1) the number of 
schemas in the self-concept, (2) content of self- 
schemas, (3) evaluative attitudes associated with 
the self-schemas, and (4) accessibility of the self- 
schemas. 
Number of schemas included in the self-concept. 
Studies have shown that people vary according to 
the number of self-schemas elaborated in memory 
(Franks, 1994; Stein, 1995a; Stein, Markus, & 
Roser, 1995). Whereas some individuals have many 
domains that are core or central to their self- 
definition, others have relatively fewer. This differ- 
ence in the elaboration of the self-concept has been 
shown to be related to such things as age, develop- 
mental stage, education and presence of psychopa- 
thology (Harter & Monsour, 1992; Franks, 1994; 
Stein, 1995a). Furthermore, individual differences 
in the number of self-schemas included in the 
self-concept have been linked to emotional and 
behavioral outcomes including depression, poor 
self-esteem (Woolfolk, Novalany, Gara, Allen, & 
Polino, 1995), and inability to adapt to stress 
(Linville, 1987). 
Content of the self-schemas. Another impor- 
tant source of individual difference is in the content 
of the self-schemas included in the self-concept. 
People vary not only according to the number of 
self-schemas, but also in the particular domains 
that are claimed as part of the self (Deux, 1991; 
Stein, Markus, & Roeser, 1995). Studies have 
shown that people differ according to whether the 
domains of health, exercise, and body weight are 
included as a part of the self-definition, and this 
source of individual difference has been linked to a 
number of health-related behavioral outcomes 
(Hooker & Kaus, 1992; Kendzierski, 1988; Markus, 
Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). 
Evaluative attitudes associated with the self- 
schemas. Another important source of individual 
difference is the positivity/negativity of the evalua- 
tive attitudes towards the self. In addition to the 
overall evaluation of one's worth, people also have 
stable attitudes reflecting their feelings of worth in 
each of the behavioral domains that comprise the 
self-concept (Harter, 1990). Studies have shown 
that people evaluate themselves differently in each 
behavioral domain that comprises the self-concept 
and that these domain-specific self-evaluations serve 
as the foundation that gives rise to one's overall 
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level of self-satisfaction (Marsh, 1986; Pelham and 
Swann, 1989; Showers, 1992). 
Accessibility of the self-schemas. Accessibility 
refers to the readiness and ease with which a 
specific cognition is activated in working memory 
and used in information processing (Higgins & 
King, 1981). Availability refers to whether a cogni- 
tion is articulated in memory (Bruner, 1957). 
Individuals differ not only according to the array of 
cognitions about the self available in memory, but 
also according to the accessibility of a given 
cognition. Some cognitions may he chronically 
accessible in working memory and therefore, persis- 
tently used as the framework for the processing of 
stimuli. Others vary in their accessibility, depend- 
ing on the social context for activation (Higgins & 
King, 1981). 
Markus has used the construct of the working 
self-concept to describe the dynamically changing 
collection of self-cognitions active in working 
memory (Markus & Kunda, 1986). The working 
self-concept refers to the subset of self-cognitions 
accessible in working memory at a given point in 
time. Whereas some self-cognitions may be chroni- 
cally activated in the working self-concept, other 
less fully elaborated self-cognitions vary in their 
accessibility in response to features of the internal 
and external environment. 
Studies have shown that accessible cognitions 
play an important role in shaping the processing of 
social information. Which dimensions of a stimulus 
that are attended to, encoded in memory, and 
recalled are dependent on the schema accessible in 
working memory (Higgins & King, 1981). Individu- 
als with an accessible schema in a domain are not 
only more likely to selectively attend to aspects of a 
social stimulus that are consistent with it but in 
addition, when a stimulus is vague, are likely to use 
the accessible cognition to interpret and assign 
meaning to the event (Bargh, Lombardi, & Hig- 
gins, 1988; Markus, Smith, & Moreland, 1985). 
The accessibility of a cognition is a function of 
features of both the internal and external environ- 
ment (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Factors that impact 
accessibility include: (1) expectations of the likeli- 
hood that the stimulus will match the category; (2) 
current motivation, goals, or need states; (3) re- 
cency of activation; (4) frequency of activation; 
and finally, (5) distinctiveness of the attributes of 
the cognition (Higgins & King, 1981). 
AN INTEGRATION OF THE SCHEMA MODEL 
WITH EXISTING WORK ON THE 
SELF-CONCEPT IN EATING DISORDERS: 
A PROPOSED MODEL 
In this section, a model of the self-concept in 
eating disorders will be proposed. The purpose of 
presenting this model is to show how the schema 
framework can be integrated with existing theoreti- 
cal and empirical work to form a comprehensive 
model of self-concept deviations associated with 
AN and BN. Within this proposed model, three 
aspects of the self-concept are addressed including 
the number, content, and accessibility of self- 
schemas. More specifically, it is suggested that a 
limited collection of positive self-schemas avail- 
able in memory, in combination with a chronically 
and inflexibly accessible body-weight self-schema, 
together lead to the onset and maintenance of the 
disordered behaviors associated with AN and BN. 
The Total Self-Concept 
Within the schema model, the identity distur- 
bance and lack of self-definition thought to be an 
important part of AN and BN could be conceptual- 
ized in terms of the number of positive self- 
schemas included in the self-concept. The feelings 
of self-doubt, incompetence, low self-esteem, and 
fear of loosing control that typify women with AN 
and BN (Gordon, 1990; Thompson, 1994) may 
actually reflect the lack of a broad and diverse 
collection of positive self-schemas available in 
memory. 
Given that self-schemas include both declarative 
and procedural knowledge, the availability of many 
positive self-schemas in memory may be consid- 
ered an internal resource that facilitates a success- 
ful transition into adulthood. An adolescent who 
has many positive self-schemas available in memory 
will have a clearer and more stable view of the self 
and a broader repertoire of behavioral strategies 
that can be used to give form and meaning to 
behavior (Markus, Cross, & Wurf, 1990). As the 
biological and social transitions of adolescence are 
encountered, the individual who has many positive 
self-schemas will have a more diverse and flexible 
collection of behaviors that can be brought to bear 
on the problems and challenges encountered. 
In contrast, the person who has few positive 
self-schemas elaborated within the self-concept 
will have fewer skills available to effectively cope 
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with challenges and will be more likely to experi- 
ence feelings of confusion, frustration, and incom- 
petence. As suggested by Bruch (1973), in an 
attempt to relieve distress and establish a sense of 
identity and self-worth, the person with few posi- 
tive self-schemas may assign unusual importance 
to her body weight self-conceptions. From this 
perspective, the impoverished field of self-schemas 
may be viewed as a vulnerability, which increases 
the risk that the body-weight self-schema will 
become the primary source of self-definition. 
The constrained field of positive self-schemas 
may be the result of two different developmental 
trajectories. In some cases, the lack of a diverse 
array of positive self-schemas may reflect an actual 
deficit in development, such that positive knowl- 
edge structures about the self were never formed. 
Many of the etiologic factors cited in the medical 
literature, such as the highly controlling and restric- 
tive parental relationship (Bruch, 1973) and the 
cautious, perfectionist personality styles of the 
child herself (Strober, 1991), may limit opportuni- 
ties for exploration and experimentation in a vari- 
ety of social and competency-based arenas. Be- 
cause the enactment of relevant behaviors and the 
related evaluations made by oneself and others are 
central to the construction and subsequent elabora- 
tion of self-schemas (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), 
individuals who have a limited range and depth of 
experience will have fewer opportunities to de- 
velop positive self-schemas. As a result, the person 
may enter adulthood with few positive self- 
schemas elaborated in memory. 
In other cases, positive self-schemas may have 
been formed earlier in development but may be- 
come disorganized and dysfunctional in response to 
a stressful life event. In these cases, the constrained 
array of positive self-schemas does not reflect a 
developmental deficit but rather an acute cognitive 
response to a stressor. This breakdown may be 
similar to what has been described as a "collapse of 
the person's world view" (Silver, Boon, & Stone, 
1983). Certain life events, such as divorce or 
separation from parents, may be so disruptive to the 
person's core self-conceptions that the total self- 
definition is threatened. During such periods of 
destabilization of the self-system, existing self- 
schemas may become fragmented and disorga- 
nized, and functionally, the individual may not have 
accessible the network of self-relevant expertise. 
The Body-Weight Self-Schema 
Among the important features of the self- 
concept that may distinguish women with an eating 
disorder from other women with identity distur- 
bances and low self-esteem may be the availability 
of a body-weight self-schema (Vitousek & Hollon, 
1990; Markus, 1990; Striegel-Moore, McAvay, & 
Rodin, 1986). The body-weight schema has been 
defined as a collection of cognitive and affective 
representations that focuses on one's body shape 
and size (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). Like 
other self-schemas, the body-weight schema is 
constructed within the social environment and 
reflects evaluations and categorizations made by 
oneself and others. However, unlike schemas that 
focus on abstract features of the self, the body- 
weight schema is thought to include not only 
semantic knowledge but also proprioceptive and 
imaginal information as well (Markus, Hamill, & 
Sentis, 1987; Wooley & Kearney-Cooke, 1986). 
Although all people have at least a rudimentary 
organization of knowledge about their body weight 
available in memory (Schilder, 1950), some people 
who assign particular importance to their body 
weight have a more elaborated and salient knowl- 
edge structure about themselves in the domain 
(Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). Within a sample 
of objectively overweight women, Markus found 
that people vary according to the availability of an 
overweight self-schema. Furthermore, this source 
of individual difference had a significant impact on 
the processing of stimuli relevant to the domain. 
For example, individuals with overweight self- 
schemas not only processed information relevant to 
their self-definitions more efficiently but also were 
more consistent in body-weight judgments about 
themselves across a variety of semantic and imagi- 
nal stimuli (Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987). In 
addition, the availability of an overweight self- 
schema impacted judgments about the desirability 
of food. Although both those with an overweight 
self-schema and those without rated a similarly 
large percentage of foods as desirable to eat, those 
with an overweight schema spent more time mak- 
ing their ratings. These findings suggest that the 
availability of a body-weight self-schema not only 
impacts the processing of information about one's 
body size and shape but also plays a role in 
decisional processes involving food. 
The body-weight self-schema provides a useful 
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theoretical framework for explaining the body- 
image disturbances associated with eating disor- 
ders. For example, the feelings of fatness and 
body-size overestimations associated with the dis- 
orders may be considered manifestations of the 
underlying overweight self-schema. The emaciated 
anorexic woman who complains of feeling fat and 
rates herself as larger than she objectively is, may 
be articulating proprioceptive information encoded 
within the self-schema at a point when she was 
objectively heavier, which is now reexperienced 
each time the body-weight self-schema is activated 
in working memory. The stable, enduring, if not 
resistant, nature of the self-schema (Markus, 1977; 
Stein, 1994) may account for why these feelings 
persist despite the obvious change in current body 
size. Similarly, the bingeing, purging, and other 
ritualistic eating and exercise behaviors can be 
viewed as the procedural knowledge that is stored 
within the self-schema and enacted each time the 
schema is activated. 
Accessibility of the Overweight Self-Schema 
A third feature of the self-concept that may 
distinguish women with eating disorders from 
other populations of women may be the accessibil- 
ity of the body weight schema. Although many 
women within the American weight-conscious cul- 
ture may have an overweight self-schema available 
in memory (Rodin, Silberstein, & Streigel-Moore, 
1985), an important distinction between those 
women who engage in mild dysregulated eating 
behaviors and those with true eating disorders may 
be the frequency with which the overweight schema 
is activated and used as the organizing framework 
in information processing. 
Self-schemas are chronically accessible cogni- 
tions. Studies have shown that self-schemas are 
automatically activated and exert a powerful influ- 
ence over the processing of self-relevant informa- 
tion (Markus, 1977; Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 
1987). Given the fact that all self-schemas are 
chronically accessible, what factors distinguish 
women with eating disorders from other women 
with overweight body self-schemas? 
For most women, an overweight body self- 
schema may be only one of a broader collection of 
positive self-schemas accessible in working 
memory. The diverse collection of accessible self- 
schemas means that each stimulus encountered 
could be examined for a match to one of multiple 
frameworks, and therefore a variety of interpreta- 
tions may be possible. In contrast, a woman with an 
overweight schema who has few other self- 
schemas accessible is likely to use the overweight 
schema as the interpretative framework for a broader 
array of self-relevant stimuli (Vitousek & Hollon, 
1990). The repeated use of the overweight self- 
schema will, in turn, serve to further heighten the 
accessibility of the structure and lead to further 
entrainment of variety of stimuli to the schema 
(Higgins & King, 1981). 
Changes in the woman's capacity for active 
processing may also heighten the accessibility of 
the overweight body self-schema. A widely ac- 
cepted view of human information processing 
suggests that people have two distinctly different 
types of attentional processes available (Butter, 
1987; Higgins & King, 1981; van Zomeren & 
Brouwer, 1994). The first type, referred to as active 
processing, is the conscious, goal-directed percep- 
tion and processing of stimuli. Active processing is 
intentional. When in this mode of functioning, the 
individual purposively focuses and sustains atten- 
tion on a stimulus event and is aware of its analysis 
and interpretation. Active processing also is consid- 
ered an effortful mental activity (Clark, Geffen, & 
Geffen, 1987). It is dependent on the activation of 
neural inhibitory mechanisms that block distracting 
and competing stimuli (Posner & Snyder, 1975). It 
is the inhibitory processes that are viewed as 
central to the person's ability to sustain purposeful 
focused attention on an stimulus event (Cimprich, 
1992a). 
The second type of processing, passive process- 
ing, refers to stimulus-controlled activation of a 
cognitive structure (Butter, 1987; Higgins & King, 
1981; vonZomeren & Brouwer, 1994). Rather than 
being under the purposeful and effortful control of 
the person, passive processing is unintentional, 
uncontrollable, and requires little cognitive effort. 
Although self-schemas and other cognitions may 
be purposively activated, most often they are 
considered a part of the passive processing system 
that become strongly associated with relevant 
stimuli and are automatically used as the process- 
ing framework whenever the stimuli are encoun- 
tered (Bargh & Pratto, 1986). Studies have shown 
that situations that demand great attention lead to 
mental fatigue and a decreased capacity for active 
processing (Cimprich, 1992b). One important con- 
sequence of mental fatigue is decreased efficiency 
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of the inhibitory mechanisms, which leads to 
greater difficulty suppressing automatic cognitive 
processes (Bargh & Thein, 1985; Cimprich, 1992a). 
During periods when active processing functions 
are intact, a woman with an overweight-body 
self-schema may be able to suppress activation of 
that self-schema and direct her attention to other 
relevant stimuli in the environment. In other words, 
she may be able to inhibit activation of the over- 
weight schema to bring other frameworks to bear in 
the processing of an event. However, during peri- 
ods of cognitive fatigue, active processing func- 
tions may be diminished and her ability to suppress 
activation of the overweight self-schema severely 
reduced. 
This formulation of diminished active process- 
ing and resultant chronic accessibility of the body- 
weight schema is consistent with findings that 
suggest that the onset of eating disorder behaviors 
is often associated with a major precipitating event 
(Garfinkel & Garner, 1983). A major life event is 
likely to be associated with many attention- 
demanding stimuli, which can lead to mental 
fatigue (Cimprich, 1992b) and a diminished ability 
to suppress the already highly accessible over- 
weight self-schema. Chronic activation of the over- 
weight schema and the associated procedural rou- 
tines, in turn, are likely to set in motion the cycle of 
food-restricting or other eating-disorder behaviors. 
Hunger, starvation, and other related physiological 
changes caused by the eating-disorder behaviors 
may serve as additional stressors, which further 
contributes to the diminished inhibitory mecha- 
nisms (Fox, 1981; Laessle, Bossert, Hank, Hahl- 
eweg, & Pirke, 1990), and a circular, reciprocal 
process may be set in motion. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE 
Use of the self-schema model as a theoretical 
approach to the self-concept in eating disorders has 
several advantages that may be important to advanc- 
ing empirical and clinical knowledge in the field. 
First, the less abstract and more concise theoretical 
definitions of the components of the self-concept 
have made the development of valid and reliable 
methods of measurement possible (Stein, 1995b). 
Currently, a number of self-report questionnaires 
and card-sorting procedures are available to mea- 
sure the contents and organization of the total 
self-concept. With the theoretical and operational 
definitions derived from the model, constructs such 
as identity and self-definition can be more precisely 
defined and measured and important clinically 
derived theories can be empirically tested. In 
addition, information-processing measures, such as 
incidental recall, response latency time for self- 
descriptive endorsements, and intrusions of nonpre- 
sented materials, have been used to assess both the 
availability and accessibility of self-schemas in 
specific behavioral domains (Markus & Sentis, 
1982). These latter techniques may be particularly 
valuable, because they measure automatic, non- 
conscious indicators of the cognitions and there- 
fore, may less likely to be affected by extraneous 
factors such as subject motivation and experimen- 
tal demand (Segal, 1988). 
A second important advantage of the self- 
schema model is that it provides a means of 
accounting for body-weight concerns and dysregu- 
lated eating behaviors of varying levels of severity. 
A widely acknowledged point within the eating- 
disorder literature is that within our contemporary 
society, concerns about body size and shape are not 
restricted to women with AN and BN. In fact, some 
have argued that dieting, weight concerns, and 
feeling "fat" are so pervasive, even among women 
of normal weight, that they may be considered 
normative (Rodin, Silberstein, Streigel-Moore, 
1985). Yet despite the epidemic proportions of 
women of all ages who struggle with weight- 
related concerns, many, if not most of them, will 
never develop the clinical syndromes of AN or BN. 
Using the schema model, it is possible to look more 
broadly across the multiple dimensions of the 
self-concept and consider how these various dimen- 
sions function together in the formation of the 
disorders. For example, in the preliminary model, it 
is posited that a unique constellation of self- 
concept deviations are necessary for the develop- 
ment of a more serious and chronic pattern of 
eating-disorder behaviors. Whereas the availability 
in memory of an overweight-body self-schema 
may lead to feelings of fatness, concern about body 
weight, and food, the co-occurrence of an impover- 
ished field of positive self-schemas, along with 
changes in active and passive processing capaci- 
ties, must occur for the body-weight schema to 
become the single most compelling source of 
self-definition and guide for action. 
A third advantage of the self-schema model is 
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that it provides an important theoretical linkage for 
explaining how the sociocultural environment ex- 
erts influence on the individual's beliefs and behav- 
iors. Cognitive approaches to psychopathology, 
particularly depression, have been criticized for 
their failure to take into account the richness of the 
interchange between the person and the environ- 
ment (Coyne, 1992). Actual negative aspects of the 
person's environment, such as marital problems or 
loss, and the negative consequences of the person's 
interpersonal style on the environment, which most 
likely contribute to both the onset and maintenance 
of depressive symptomology, typically are unad- 
dressed. Given that a main tenet of the schema 
model is that cognitions about the self are a product 
of the sociocultural environment, formed and modi- 
fied through interpersonal interactions (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991; Stewart & Healy, 1989), the 
model provides a means for explaining how envi- 
ronmental transactions are internalized into per- 
sonal beliefs and goals. Within this framework, the 
self-schemas may be considered the critical mediat- 
ing variables for explaining how aspects of the 
immediate interpersonal and broader sociocultural 
environments---either in the form of cultural stan- 
dards for female beauty (Rodin, Silberstein, & 
Streigel-Moore, 1985), persistent teasing by peers 
(Thompson & Heinberg, 1993), or controlling, 
perfectionistic parental standards (Bruch, 1 9 7 3 ) -  
impact processes of self-regulation and behavior 
(Cantor, 1990; Markus & Wurf, 1987). 
Finally, the value of the self-schema model as a 
theoretical framework in eating disorders ulti- 
mately rests on the extent to which it can be used to 
generate effective intervention strategies. Cur- 
rently, interventions on the self-concept in eating 
disorders focus on changing faulty beliefs about 
one's body weight and shape (Butters & Cash, 
1987; Fairburn, 1985; Garner & Bemis, 1982; 
Wooley & Kearney-Cook, 1986). The schema 
model holds the potential for extending that focus 
to other structural and functional properties of the 
self-concept. For example, if empirical evidence is 
accrued to support the preliminary model outlined 
above, then in addition to focusing on changes in 
the content of the body-weight self-schema, inter- 
ventions may also profitably focus on modifying its 
chronic accessibility. In this case, interpersonal 
interactions that focus on food and body weight 
might be discouraged, and even treatment strate- 
gies such as food diaries and meal planning could 
be reevaluated for their effects on the accessibility 
of body-weight schema. Another strategy to de- 
crease the accessibility of the body-weight schema 
may be to facilitate the elaboration of other sources 
of self-definition. Building on the view that women 
with an eating disorder lack a clear self-definition 
and hence, a source of positive self-esteem (Bruch, 
1973; Garner & Garfinkel, 1981), an important 
focus of therapy may be on the construction of new 
self-schemas. Rather than striving to change exist- 
ing negative cognitions about one's body weight, 
interventions aimed at identifying unacknowledged 
personal strengths and elaborating them into valued 
sources of self-definition may be an important 
strategy for diminishing the accessibility of the 
body-weight self-definition and improving confi- 
dence and self-esteem. 
In summary, the self-concept has been broadly 
recognized a key factor in the onset and mainte- 
nance of the symptoms associated with AN and 
BN. For more than three decades, investigators 
from diverse orientations have argued that the 
person's attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts about the 
self are critical in understanding the disorders. 
Continued advances in understanding the role of 
the self-concept in eating disorders, however, rest 
firmly on our ability to integrate the rapidly grow- 
ing body of knowledge about the self-concept into 
our work. The self-schema model is a rich and 
promising theoretical framework that holds the 
potential for strengthening not only our understand- 
ing but also our effectiveness in dealing with these 
grave and debilitating illnesses. 
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